

ARMS CONTROL INSPECTION PREPARATION

This pamphlet is the fifth presentation in a series about the potential security impact of arms control inspections prepared by the On-Site Inspection Agency to increase ***Readiness Through Awareness*** of the defense industry. Additional copies of this pamphlet and other cost-free materials about arms control agreements and treaties are also available from OSIA.

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INTRODUCTION

The United States is partner to a host of arms control agreements that give foreign inspectors unprecedented access to U.S. Government, government contractor and private industrial facilities. In many cases, the presence of foreign inspectors will increase the risks of divulging national security, proprietary, and other sensitive information to foreign governments or competitor companies. A limited number of facility managers are already planning, preparing, and hosting periodic international inspections.

In contrast, there are thousands of industrial facilities that are unaware, unprepared, and uncertain of ever hosting international arms control inspectors. For the latter, the costs of inaction could be high. This pamphlet will help you measure your facility's susceptibility to arms control inspections and then outline some basic planning considerations as you prepare to host your first international arms control inspection.



IS MY FACILITY SUSCEPTIBLE?

Identify Agreements

The first step in assessing susceptibility is to identify the arms control agreements that could affect you. Among the best resources for arms control information are treaty pamphlets and security information bulletins that the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) publishes on a periodic basis. They provide a snapshot of various arms control activities and how they may impact industrial facilities. Also available through OSIA are detailed video presentations and briefings on treaty-related topics, as well as electronic bulletin board systems that provide current information on arms control security concerns.

In addition to OSIA products, the Defense Investigative Service (DIS) publishes the Industrial Security Letter, and you should look for articles in trade association newsletters, journals, and other publications.

Consider Likelihood

Once you have identified arms control agreements that could impact your facility, the next step is to consider your likelihood of inspection. **Figure 1** illustrates the type of activities that could increase susceptibility to inspection under two arms control agreements,

the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).

The START treaty is designed to reduce the number of deployed intercontinental and submarine launched ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs), heavy bombers, and the nuclear warheads on those systems. It provides each treaty partner a right to request a special right of access visit (SAV) at any location, declared or undeclared, to resolve a specific compliance concern. Undeclared facilities, particularly those involved in the aerospace industry, that possess the START factors in **Figure 1** could be likely candidates for SAVs.

START You may be susceptible if you . . .	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Produce, test, assemble or maintain components or subcomponents of treaty-limited items (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers)• Produce, test, assemble or maintain systems similar to treaty-limited items (e.g., space launch vehicles, systems)
CWC You may be susceptible if you . . .	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Produced and/or used scheduled chemicals in quantities less than the reporting threshold in the last three years• Produce phosphorus, sulfur or fluorine (PSF) containing chemicals in quantities less than the reporting threshold• Have a history (more than three years ago) of producing scheduled and PSF chemicals• Possess facilities with the capability/capacity to produce more than threshold quantities of scheduled or PSF chemicals• Possess facilities with possible indicators of chemical activities, such as massive air handling systems, tall chimneys and scrubbers, and chemical holding tanks

FIGURE 1: INSPECTION SUSCEPTIBILITY FACTORS



Of the numerous agreements signed, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is noted for having the most far reaching and intrusive verification regime in history. The CWC requires signatory nations to provide information to an international regulatory body concerning a wide range of activities related to production, acquisition, transfer, storage, and use of specified chemicals. The United States is a CWC signatory, so more than 6000 U.S. commercial industries must file reports and declarations and participate in periodic routine verification inspections. The CWC also permits challenge inspections at any facility suspected of engaging in prohibited activities. The CWC factors in **Figure 1** may increase the likelihood of a challenge inspection.

WHAT ARE MY RISKS?

Identify Sensitivities

Once you understand your susceptibility, you can begin to assess risks. Your assessment should focus on two factors: 1) the need to protect national security, proprietary or other sensitive information or processes; and, 2) the threat posed by the presence of foreign inspectors. The first factor is relatively straightforward. Facility, program, and security

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managers know what requires special protection from disclosure or exposure. Ask the question, "Could knowledge of this piece of information be of value to an adversary or competitor in achieving their objectives?" If the answer is yes, some type of protective measure may be warranted.

The presence of sensitive information alone is not sufficient to determine risk. Next, you must consider the probability of disclosure or loss during potential inspections and visits. Again, knowledge is key. You must understand those agreements that could impact you, particularly any provisions concerning inspector rights and obligations. Who are the inspectors? What activities do they have the right to perform? What may they merely ask to do? What are your obligations? What range of responses are permissible? Is the information collectable in its present state? What is the criticality of impact? Answers to questions like these will help you assess your risks and prioritize countermeasure activities.

For more information and better insight into arms control issues affecting your facility, consider attending periodic DTIRP seminars and conferences sponsored by OSIA (the DTIRP phone number is given below). These events are designed to familiarize facility and security managers with the security risks

Evaluate Risk

Attend DTIRP Seminars



associated with contemporary and prospective arms control agreements.

Assess Security

Most facilities are unable to develop and maintain detailed arms control expertise, but help is available to assist in conducting arms control risk analysis. OSIA and the other DTIRP members can conduct a thorough assessment of your facility or programs, providing an understanding of specific arms control provisions associated with your security concerns. Working with your facility's security and program managers, they can help you conduct a multisource analytical arms control security assessment. If you would like more information about DTIRP security operations, contact your local DIS representative or OSIA's DTIRP Industry Outreach Program at 1-800-419-2899.

SHOULD I BEGIN TO PREPARE?

Understand Timelines

Following an examination of your susceptibility and risk, you can make a reasoned decision about the extent of preparation. There is, however, one additional factor to consider: How much notification time will you receive?

Inspection Preparation

In some cases, facilities will receive enough advance notification to allow for thorough preparation. In others, the notification may occur within a few days of the inspection team's arrival.

For example, under START, the SAV process involves a number of activities over a time period that could consume several months. **Figure 2** illustrates a typical SAV timeline. This time, coupled with established government assistance procedures, mitigates the need to engage in extensive advance preparations. In most cases, advance preparation is advisable only for undeclared facilities with sensitivities whose protection require extensive preparation time.




FIGURE 2: START SAV TIMELINE



In contrast, the notification timeframe for CWC challenge inspection is quite condensed (see **Figure 3**). The first indication that your facility is the subject of a challenge inspection will likely be a notification just 12 hours before the inspection team's scheduled arrival in the United States. From this arrival time, 36 hours will elapse before the inspectors will be at your facility, ready to begin deliberations essential to the inspection. Although a U.S. Government assistance team may be available to help, you will have a limited time to get ready to receive the inspection team, prepare buildings and personnel, and determine how to demonstrate U.S. compliance with the Treaty.




FIGURE 3: CWC CHALLENGE INSPECTION TIMELINE

Inspection Preparation

You need not conduct extensive planning and preparation if you determine that 1) your susceptibility and risks are low, and that 2) you will have sufficient time to prepare. Simply remaining aware of developments/issues involving arms control agreements that could affect your facility is sufficient. Some planning and preparation may be warranted if your susceptibility and risks are high, and you are not comfortable with your potential notification time. The following paragraphs outline several cost-effective steps you can take now, without expending extensive resources.

WHAT CAN I DO?

Keepest abreast of information concerning arms control agreements. The sources identified earlier can provide valuable information. It may be wise to assign responsibility for remaining current to a particular individual or office. Since security concerns will pervade all aspects of an inspection, your security officer may be the best choice. As you acquire information, use it to sustain an appropriate awareness level, particularly with those whose assistance will be vital during an inspection.

Stay Educated



Think Through the Process

Armed with this information, think through the inspection process and determine how it may affect you. The number of people involved may be surprising. For instance, before an inspection team arrives, U.S. assistance teams may deploy to your location to provide support. Then, the inspection team (with as many as 50 inspectors) could arrive at your facility. Along with them will be a number of U.S. escorts. During a CWC challenge inspection, a host team comprised of government and military representatives may guide the inspection. Add to these a number of observers, and a crowded picture emerges. Everyone will need lodging, meals, transportation, and work space. Communications, public relations and safety will be important—and security concerns will pervade all activities.

Review Visit Procedures

Inspection planning does not have to start from scratch. An excellent starting point is to review and modify, as appropriate, your facility's current procedures to host visitors, especially foreign visitors. These can include procedures for coordinating arrival, transportation, lodging, and meals, and providing site information, safety briefings and facility tours. The planning and assets you use for these activities can serve you well during an inspection.

Particularly important are the security manager, program managers, administrative, contract and logistics personnel, legal counsel, public relations representative, and (if applicable) tenant activities. These personnel form a nucleus of people you know, and more important, people who know your facility and programs.

In reviewing visit procedures, direct particular attention to certain elements that relate to hosting a foreign inspection team. These elements are discussed below; in most areas you need only consider how to accomplish the activities within treaty-mandated time frames. An important step is having information available to assist the U.S. Government escort team leader who will make final logistical, administrative, and financial arrangements.

***Focus on
Important
Elements***

Consider developing a mechanism to notify key personnel 24-hours a day. A simple approach is to gather, and periodically update, the names and phone numbers of relevant key personnel. Periodically test your notification system to ensure functionality and sustain awareness.

Notification

Location, convenience and security are the primary concerns in planning to house foreign inspectors. The element or office at your facility that normally coordinates lodging for

Lodging



guests, working with knowledgeable security personnel, can develop a list of nearby lodging, preferably with dining facilities on the premises. Such locations should be conveniently located, but not directly adjacent to or overlooking your facility. Accommodations that are separated by a reasonable distance from your facility will help prevent unwanted observation of your activities.

Personal Security

Foreign inspectors have limited diplomatic immunity. Therefore, any incidents involving their safety while at or near your facility could have international repercussions. Your FSO or security manager may contact local law enforcement agencies to determine lodging areas that are considered secure and free from criminal activity as well as appropriate for foreign dignitaries. Having identified convenient and secure lodging facilities, you can then have the appropriate office maintain a copy of this list. With it and a few phone calls, you can provide valuable information to all potential guests, and assist the U.S. escort team to arrange and pay for lodging.

Meals

Providing meals, refreshments, and drinking water for a large group is a substantial undertaking. While morning and evening meals may occur off-site, inspectors may need to have meals on-site to facilitate inspection

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activities. Do you have a facility cafeteria that can handle the surge of inspectors, escorts, and other possible inspection personnel? If not, the appropriate office should maintain a list of caterers or other establishments that could provide carry-out meals and refreshments on relatively short-notice.

Transportation presents some special considerations. You may be responsible for transporting the inspectors while they are on your facility, and for helping to coordinate their off-site transportation. Can you provide vans or buses with drivers for use during the inspection process? If so, you gain the advantage of controlling inspector access in familiar vehicles with knowledgeable drivers. If you do not have such capability, you may want to identify and maintain the phone numbers of acceptable sources of vehicles and drivers that are responsive to potentially short-notice requirements.

Transportation

From a security perspective, it is important that drivers be knowledgeable and courteous, but not offer information or tip-offs concerning sensitive or proprietary activities. You should also consider routes to, from and within your site boundaries that avoid unnecessarily traversing or bordering sensitive areas.



Work Spaces

You will need areas which can accommodate briefings, negotiations, and other inspection management activities. The foreign inspectors will also need work space separate from the escort and U.S. Government work area. You should identify suitable spaces now, preferably in areas away from sensitive information and with no connectivity to automated information systems. If use of this space will require displacing personnel or activities, consider how you will handle the situation. If adequate space is not readily available, an alternative could be using off-site conference facilities.

Administration

Hosting an inspection team requires a lot of administrative support. You will likely need computer support and copiers to prepare, duplicate, and provide documents, records and diagrams to the inspection team. The inspectors may also require computer and copier support.

Another administrative requirement will be to prepare and present briefings. Typically, a facility representative provides a safety and site familiarization briefing during the initial phase of any inspection. During the inspection, team leaders for both parties often need to convey information in group settings. Finally, upon conclusion, the facility representative, the inspection team leader, escort team leader, and other government representatives gather for an out-briefing and informal concluding

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ceremony. Each of these activities may require use of visual aids, conference areas, or public address systems.

Coordinating communication requirements can be a challenge. Inspectors and escorts will likely need access to several outside telephone lines from their work areas. During the inspection, escorts may need hand-held or portable communications devices to support inspector subgroups and to coordinate transportation. If you use frequency modulation (FM) radios, you should use the appropriate Digital Encryption Standard (DES) to protect proprietary or sensitive communications. Before you use cellular telephones you may have to check to ensure they do not interfere with equipment in use on the facility. Will you permit use of cellular phones or FM radios in sensitive areas? Are there safety considerations? Thinking through answers to questions like these will improve your preparation.

Communications

Your planning should consider routine and emergency medical support. Planning considerations range from advance notification to your medical clinic or office to coordinating with the nearest hospital for treatment of foreign personnel. Plan not only for emergency treatment while personnel are performing

Medical Support



inspections, but also should an incident occur while dining or resting at their place of lodging.

Public Relations

Your public relations or public affairs office will be an important player during an inspection. The individual(s) responsible for public relations might consider conducting library or on-line searches of databases containing press or other public information relative to your facility. Reviewing this information in conjunction with the FSO or security manager could provide valuable insight into how the public and the rest of the world views your facility and its activities.

You may also consider what an allegation of non-compliance under START and the CWC would mean for your facility's public image. A CWC challenge inspection for example, could be damaging, particularly given U.S. sensitivity to environmental and chemical issues. The Department of Defense will likely provide public affairs guidance to defense contractor facilities subject to challenge inspections. Even so, you may consider developing a public affairs plan for dealing with the news media and the general public. In all cases, your objective should be to support the U.S. goal--demonstrating compliance with the Treaty.

The protection of national security and proprietary information is the objective of inspection planning. You should review existing security plans and procedures in the context of having professional foreign arms control inspectors on-site. A good starting point may be your procedures for bringing uncleared visitors, such as maintenance technicians, or emergency medical or fire response teams, into your sensitive areas. Remember though, that you may **not** wish to demonstrate your normal physical security procedures to foreign personnel. Instead, consider using fire exits or other non-conventional passageways to make your security operations transparent to the inspectors.

As with all other preparation activities, you must weigh how much security planning, training or other preparation you do against the probability of an inspection. Finally, remember that your security considerations must extend not only to the information, personnel, equipment, and physical facilities under your ownership and control, but also to your inspectors and other guests.



Consider Other Measures

In addition to the relatively simple thought processes and steps outlined in this pamphlet, you may consider engaging in more substantive planning. This can include attending formal training sessions, conducting table-top and other in-house training exercises, and participating as an observer on a mock inspection at another facility. Certain facilities may even consider developing a comprehensive inspection readiness plan to direct facility activities in the event of an inspection.

However, you will want to be sure that you have carefully examined your susceptibility and risk before undertaking preparatory measures that involve expenditure of significant resources. And remember, consult your DoD-sponsor before engaging in any preparatory activities. In most cases, thinking through the inspection process and how it can affect you, as well as maintaining a vigilant awareness of arms control issues, may preclude expenditure of unnecessary resources.

CONCLUSION

This pamphlet has introduced you to some basic considerations of the inspection preparation process. Inspection preparation potentially concerns all facility and security managers because new and emerging arms control agreements allow inspection of facilities anywhere in the United States. Such inspections can significantly impact daily operations and could place a facility's sensitive and proprietary information at risk.

In most cases, however, the probability of an inspection at your particular facility is low. Simply understanding your susceptibility and identifying your risks will enable you to decide what, if any, planning or preparation is prudent. You must carefully weigh expenditure of resources to prepare for an event that may never occur against the potential risk to sensitive information. If you decide that you need additional information about the topics discussed here, as well as other related security countermeasure activities, please contact OSIA's DTIRP Industry Outreach Program Manager at 1-800-419-2899 or your local Defense Investigative Service representative.



Notes

Please take a few minutes to fill out the survey (on the following page) on the education and outreach program and product you have received or viewed and mail or fax it to OSIA at (703) 810-4098.

TELL US WHAT YOU THINK

The On-Site Inspection Agency needs your feedback to provide the most useful information on arms control agreements and their impact on facilities. Please take a few moments to fill out this survey on the education and outreach program and product you have received or viewed and mail or fax it to OSIA at (703) 810-4098.

Awareness

1. Please indicate your familiarity with the Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program (DTIRP):
 - 1 ☐ None previously
 - 2 ☐ Familiar
 - 3 ☐ Have previously received DTIRP assistance
2. Please indicate your familiarity with the DTIRP arms control security education and awareness outreach program:
 - 1 ☐ First time exposure
 - 2 ☐ Familiar
 - 3 ☐ Possess and use outreach products

Availability

3. How did you obtain this product?
 - 1 ☐ Borrowed/copied this item
 - 2 ☐ Received free at a seminar or other event
 - 3 ☐ Knew about and requested product from OSIA
 - 4 ☐ On a mailing list
 - 5 ☐ Other _____
4. Please indicate the number of DTIRP products you have used:
 - 1 ☐ None before this
 - 2 ☐ One
 - 3 ☐ Two
 - 4 ☐ Three
 - 5 ☐ Four or more

Appropriateness (suitability, fitness)

5. With respect to the potential arms control implementation impact upon your facility, did the information provided in this product address your concerns?
 - 1 ☐ No
 - 2 ☐ Somewhat
 - 3 ☐ Yes

Usefulness (utility, application)

6. Was the amount of information provided appropriate?
 - 1 ☐ Too little
 - 2 ☐ Somewhat
 - 3 ☐ Yes
7. Was the level of information provided appropriate?
 - 1 ☐ Too basic
 - 2 ☐ Too complicated
 - 3 ☐ About right

Reference: DTIRP Industry Outreach series No. 905P

8. Was the information provided in this product useful?

- 1 ☐ No
2 ☐ Somewhat
3 ☐ Yes

Format

9. Was the format of this product appropriate for your needs?

- 1 ☐ No
2 ☐ Somewhat
3 ☐ Yes

10. Please rank each format in order of your preference for receiving arms control information. (1 is lowest, 6 is highest)

- ☐ One page bulletin
☐ Pamphlet
☐ Video
☐ Briefing
☐ Article in magazine
☐ Bulletin Board Service/Internet home page

11. How likely would you be to find and download this product if it were available electronically on the Internet?

- 1 ☐ Not likely
2 ☐ Somewhat
3 ☐ Very likely

Future Topics

12. Please indicate your facility's need for information about the following arms control agreements (1 is lowest, 4 is highest).

- ☐ Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
☐ Open Skies Treaty
☐ Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
☐ Other (Please designate) _____

13. Who at your facility could make best use of this product?

- ☐ Security manager
☐ Program/Project manager
☐ Facility/Plant manager
☐ Executive levels
☐ Other (please specify) _____

14. Please indicate type of facility you represent:

- ☐ Military
☐ Defense contractor
☐ U.S. government
☐ Private industry

Additional Comments:

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Attn: SECURITY OFFICE (SO)
ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY
201 WEST SERVICE ROAD, DULLES IAP
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20041-0498

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**Attn: Security Office (SO)
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Defense Treaty Inspection Readiness Program